University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1967

Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment
Harry Kalven Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Harry Kalven, Jr., "Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment," 14 UCLA Law Review 428
(1967).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

UPON REREADING MR. JUSTICE BLACK
ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Harry Kalven, Jr.*
Some years ago I had the good fortune to hear a colleague of
mine at the University of Chicago introduce Frank Lloyd Wright to
a large and enthusiastic audience. His introduction was a stunning
success. Wright was at the time in his eighties, and the list of his
services to contemporary architecture was virtually endless. My
colleague said simply: "Ladies and gentlemen, Frank Lloyd
Wright." When the topic is the first amendment and freedom of
speech, only a comparable gesture is appropriate. One should be
permitted to say: "Fellow Americans, Mr. Justice Black."
There is, to be sure, always some perplexity as to just what it
is one is doing when he elects to study the performance of an
individual judge.1 Good judging would seem preeminently an
activity that defies individualization; and the matter is further
aggravated when the judge is a member of a collegial court. Should
all of his votes be considered or only the occasions when he writes?
If the former, one seems to be talking pretty much about the Court
as a whole; if the latter, it must be something of an accident as to
when the judge writes. Finally, there is that perennial question of
whether one is appraising his performance of the judicial role or
is weighing substantively the merits of his views on policy.
In any event, the Black box score is interesting. By my somewhat arbitrary count there have been 105 cases touching the free
speech category since Justice Black came to the Court in 1937.'He has written individually in some 54 cases and these 54 opinions
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
1 I have had occasion recently to wrestle with the problem at a private law

level, attempting to trace the profile of Justice Traynor's work as a judge in tort
law. See Kalven, Torts: The Quest for Appropriate Standards, 53 CA=. L. REV. 189
(1965).
2 Two factors in particular make exact classification of free speech cases difficult
and futile. Many of the cases involving anti-Communist measures were argued and
disposed of largely on grounds of procedural due process without reference to freedom of speech or association. See, e.g., Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) ; Barsky
v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) ; Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) ;
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) ; United States
v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). Further, within first amendment cases it is not easy
to isolate sharply speech cases from freedom of religion cases. Consider, e.g., In re
Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
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are the anthology of his first amendment work.' It is worth adding
that in only 10 instances has he written the majority opinion, and
few if any of these majority opinions now appear to be major.4
Of the other 44 cases, he was in 27 writing in dissent and in the
remaining 17 in concurrence. His major impact has thus come when
he was writing for himself, and his work as a judge in the free
speech area has an unusual degree of individuality.
In both the popular and the professional eye, Justice Black has
inherited the mantle of Holmes and Brandeis. The amendment now
bears his personal trademark as it once did theirs. It is, therefore,
instructive to note how much easier they had it in that relatively
short and relatively tranquil span from Schenck v. United States5 to
Near v. Minnesota' and Stromberg v. California.7 They were not
asked to test classic notions of freedom of speech against group
defamation, labor picketing, obscenity, congressional committees,
sound trucks, public issue picketing, sit-ins, or that large array of
direct and indirect sanctions imposed upon the domestic Communist movement.
To review Mr. Justice Black's thirty years of service to the
first amendment, therefore, is to review all of the contemporary
problems of free speech. It requires, and deserves, a book. I cannot
attempt more here than to comment selectively on a few of the
impressions I have had upon rereading Justice Black on the first
amendment."
I
To begin with, he passes a major test for a great judge on
free speech issues. He displays the requisite passion. The requirement is not so much a question of arguing for the preferred position
thesis; it is rather that the judge respond to the fact that this is
not just another rule or principle of law. Mr. Justice Black has
for thirty years always risen to the occasion when a free speech
8 A useful collection of many, but not quite all, of the relevant opinions
through 1962 is found in DnuxARD, ONE MAN'S STAND FOR FREEDom: HUGO LAFAYETTE
BLACK AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1963). The Dillard book also contains a convenient
bibliography of the literature on Justice Black as well as the Justice's two best known
non-judicial utterances: his James Madison Lecture in 1960, at New York University,
and his public interview in 1962 with Edmond Cahn.
4 The most likely candidates are one of his earliest, Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 (1941), and his latest, Adderley v. Florida, 87 Sup. Ct. 242 (1966), which
came down while this article was being written. See note 121 infra.
5 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
6 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
7 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
8

ment.

That is, on the speech, press, assembly, and petition clauses of the first amend-

HeinOnline -- 14 UCLA L. Rev. 429 1966-1967

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:428

issue was at stake; he has always been vigilant and concerned. And
as. a result his style has often had the appropriate eloquence, although he never perhaps quite matches Holmes, Hand, Brandeis,
or Jackson.
Listen once more to the moving conclusion of his dissent in
Dennis v. United States,9 written now some fifteen years ago:
Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest the conviction
of these Communist petitioners. There is hope, however, that in calmer
times, when present pressures, passions, and fears subside, this or
to the
some later Court will restore the First Amendment liberties
0
high preferred place where they belong in a free society.'

Nine years'later in Communist Party of the United States v.
11 Justice Black opened his disSubversive Activities Control Bd.,
sent in even more somber tones:
I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms
of speech, press, petition, and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they
will be denied to the ideas we cherish. The first banning of an association
because it advocates hated ideas-whether that association be called a
political party or not-marks a fateful moment in the history of 12a
free country. That moment seems to have arrived for this country.

And he brought the opinion, perhaps the most extensive first amendment opinion he has written,' 3 to a close in that case with the
following comment:
I would reverse this case and leave the Communists free to advocate
their beliefs in proletarian dictatorship publicly and openly among
the people of this country with the full confidence that the people
will remain loyal to any democratic government truly dedicated to
some of us
freedom and justice--the kind of government which
14
still think of as being "the last best hope of earth.'

Often the depth of. his concern is shown by the flash of irony.5
There is the last sentence of his dissent in Beauharnais v. Illinois,
9-341 U.S. 494 (1951).
10 Id. at 581.

11 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
Id. at 137.
3 The opinion runs thirty-three pages. In general, his opinions have been distinctive in their brevity; in the Dennis case, for example, where the full opinions of
the Court occupy some ninety-eight pages of the reports, Justice Black uses only
two and one-half pages for his deeply felt dissent.
14 367 U.S. at 169. These passages are good examples of the nature of Justice
Black's style. He is no Holmes or Lincoln, and hence will not originate phrases like
"the thought we hate," but he has an ear for their distinctive power and will use
them easily,
15 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
12
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where the Court had upheld group defamation laws: "If there be
minority groups who hail this holding as their victory, they might
consider the possible relevancy of this ancient remark: Another
such victory and I am undone!""0 And there is his exasperation
with the majority decision in In re Summers,"7 upholding the refusal
to admit a conscientious objector to the practice of law in Illinois:
It may be, as many people think, that Christ's Gospel of love and
submission is not suited to a world in which men still fight and kill
one another. But I am not ready to say that a mere profession of belief
in that Gospel is a sufficient reason to keep otherwise well-qualified
men out of the legal profession .... 18

Or again, and in much the same vein, there is his observation in
In re Anastaplo, 9 another bar admission case where the petitioner
had in his initial application noted the right of revolution as a
constitutional principle and had refused to answer questions about
Communist affiliation:
And I think the record clearly shows that conflict resulted, not from
any fear on Anastaplo's part to divulge his own political activities,
but from a sincere, and in my judgment correct, conviction that the
preservation of this country's freedom depends upon adherence to our
Bill of Rights. The very most that can fairly be said against Anastaplo's
position in this entire matter is that he took too much of the responsibility of preserving that freedom upon himself. 2°

It is characteristic of the depth of his concern over freedom of
speech that it should find one of its most eloquent and sustained
expressions in a case not normally thought of as in the first amendment family, Carlson v. Landon.2 1 The case involved provisions
of the Internal Security Act affecting the deportability of resident
aliens who were members of the Communist Party. The precise
issue was whether the Attorney General could keep the aliens in
custody without bail pending a determination of their status. Justice
Black in a lengthy dissent, arguing a variety of other grounds,
found the vice to be in part a violation of the first amendment:
As previously pointed out, the basis of holding these people in jail
is a fear that they may indoctrinate people with Communist beliefs.
To put people in jail for fear of their talk seems to me an abridgement
of speech in flat violation of the First Amendment. I have to admit, how16 Id. at 275. The allusion is a favorite of his. In Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 156 (1959) (concurring opinion), he says: "Their victory, if any, is a pyrrhic

one."
17 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
Id. at 576.
19 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
20 Id. at 114.
21 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
18
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ever, that this is a logical application of recent cases watering down
constitutional liberty of speech. I also realize that many believe that
Communists and "fellow travelers" should not be accorded any of the
First Amendment protections. My belief is that we must have freedom of speech, press and religion for all or we may eventually have it
for none. I further believe that the First Amendment grants an absolute right to believe in any governmental system, discuss all governmental affairs, and argue for desired changes in the existing order.
This freedom is too dangerous for bad, tyrannical governments to
permit. But those who wrote and adopted our First Amendment
weighed those dangers against the dangers of censorship and deliberately chose the First Amendment's unequivocal command that freedom
of assembly, petition, speech and press shall not be abridged. I happen
to believe this was a wise choice and that our free way of life enlists
such respect and love that our Nation cannot be imperiled by mere
talk. This belief of mine may and I suppose does influence me to
protest whenever I see even slight encroachments on First Amendment liberties. But the encroachment here is not small. True it is
mainly those alleged to be present or past "Communists" who are now
being jailed for their beliefs and expressions. But we cannot be sure
more victims will not be offered up later if the First Amendment
than its enemies or even some of its friends believe
means no more
22
that it does.

This last example of his style serves as a summary of a basic
philosophy which reappears in many opinions: Freedom of speech
is indivisible; unless we protect it for all, we will have it for none.
It is a sign of weakness to control speech; only democracies can
afford the gallant gamble on utter freedom of speech-it is too
dangerous for tyranny. The choice for freedom of speech is a
choice made once and for all by the Founding Fathers and is not
subject to reassessment in light of current anxieties. It is a profoundly wise choice.

II
Mr. Justice Black's opinions are distinctive also in their use
of the history of human freedom. We are reminded again and again
that the history of tyranny and intolerance is a long one and that
today's ill-fated decision has a striking resemblance to mistakes of

the past. The result is to lend a special stature and solemnity to his

observations.
23
In his dissent in Barenblatt v. United States, a House Un-

American Activities Committee contempt case, he explicitly draws
the moral from history for us:
Id. at 555.
23 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
22
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Today we deal with Communists or suspected Communists. In 1920,
instead, the New York Assembly suspended duly elected legislators on
the ground that, being Socialists, they were disloyal to the country's
principles. In the 1830's the Masons were hunted as outlaws and subversives, and abolitionists were considered revolutionaries of the most
dangerous kind in both North and South. Earlier still, at the time of
the universally unlamented alien and sedition laws, Thomas Jefferson's
party was attacked and its members were derisively called "Jacobins."
Fisher Ames described the party as a "French faction" guilty of "subversion" and "officered, regimented and formed to subordination." Its
members, he claimed, intended to "take arms against the laws as
soon as they dare." History should teach us then, that in times of high
emotional excitement minority parties and groups which advocate
extremely unpopular social or governmental innovations will always
be typed as criminal gangs and attempts will always be made to drive
them out. It was knowledge of this fact, and of its great dangers,
that caused the Founders of our land to enact the First Amendment
as a guarantee that neither Congress nor the people would do anything
to hinder or destroy the capacity of individuals and groups to seek
converts and votes for any cause, however radical or unpalatable
24
their principles might seem under the accepted notions of the time.
Often the history cited is not an altogether familiar one. Thus
in Uphaus v. Wyman,2 5 a case involving a one-man legislative investigation into subversion, conducted by the Attorney General of
New Hampshire, Justice Black on the denial of the second appeal,
after reviewing the case of John Udall in 1590, had this to say
of John Bunyan's problems:
It would not be difficult to point out many other cases such as
that of Udall, but I will content myself with one other. Some seventy
years after John Udall's experiences, there was a dissenting preacher
in England named John Bunyan. He was arrested for preaching and
efforts were made to get him to agree not to preach any more. He
refused to be coerced into silence. The result was that he was put through
a kind of trial and sentenced to prison for holding "several unlawful
[religious] meetings . . . to the great disturbance and distraction of
the good subjects of this kingdom . . . ." In Bunyan's case the imprisonment lasted 12 years, and it was during those 12 years that
he gave to the world The Pilgrim's Progress. One of the judges who
acquiesced in the imprisonment of Bunyan was Sir Matthew Hale,
later Lord Chief Justice Hale, a man described by Lord Campbell as
"one of the most pure, the most pious, the most independent, and the
most learned" Chief Justices England ever had. That this description
is not entirely unjustified, despite the fact that his record was also
marred by the part he took in the conviction and sentencing to death
24 Id. at 150-51. There is a more extended reference to this same history in his
dissent in Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control

Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 149 (1961).
25 364 U.S. 388, 389 (1960). This dissent occurs in a second appeal of the case,

while Uphaus was in jail, based on a change in the New Hampshire law. The original
contempt case is 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
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of two .unfortunate women as witches, is, I think, a tragic commentary
upon the record of the judiciary, during that period, in discharging its
duty to protect civil liberties. It is perhaps one of the ironies of history
that the name of John Bunyan, a poor tinker and preacher, is at least
as well known and respected today as that of the great Chief Justice
of England who permitted him to languish in jail.
My guess is that history will look with no more favor upon the
imprisonment of Willard Uphaus than it has upon that of Udall, Bun26
yan or the many others like them.
Perhaps the most felicitous instance of his use of history is
2" where Justice
found in Talley v. California
Black wrote for the
majority. The Court held unconstitutional an ordinance requiring
that no handbills be distributed in public places without disclosing
the names of the authors, printers, and distributors. This time
Justice Black drew upon history to teach the importance of anonymity:

Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have
played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted
groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able
to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at
all. The obnoxious press licensing.law of England, which was also enforced on the Colonies was due in part to the knowledge that exposure
of the names of printers, writers and distributors would lessen the circulation of literature critical of the government. The old seditious libel
cases in England show the lengths to which government had to go to
find out who was responsible for books that were obnoxious to the
rulers. John Lilburne was whipped, pilloried and fined for refusing
to answer questions designed to get evidence to convict him or someone else for the secret distribution of books in England. Two Puritan
Ministers, John Penry and John Udall, were sentenced to death on
charges that they were responsible for writing, printing or publishing
books. Before the Revolutionary War colonial patriots frequently had
to conceal their authorship or distribution of literature that easily
could have brought down on them prosecutions by English-controlled
courts. Along about that time the Letters of Junius were written and
the identity of their author is unknown to this day. Even the Federalist Papers, written in favor of the adoption of our Constitution, were
published under fictitious names. It is plain that anonymity has some28
times been assumed for the most constructive purposes.

III
In many ways the most fascinating dimension of a study of
Justice Black and the first amendment is the drama of his steady
26
27

364 U.S. at 398-400.
362 U.S. 60 (1960).

28

Id. at 64-65.

HeinOnline -- 14 UCLA L. Rev. 434 1966-1967

THE FIRST AMENDMENT

1967]

contrast with Justice Frankfurter. 29 For the greatest part of Justice
Black's career on the Court he had Justice Frankfurter as a colleague. Although very different in background, personality, and
style, the justices have surely had two major things in common:
they are truly serious judges and they are lovers of freedom. The
fascination, of course, is that nevertheless they end up so very often
in disagreement over the application of the first amendment-

3 4 Konigsberg
33
3l
Kingsley,
Dennis,12 Feiner,
Adler,s° Beauharnais,
40
39
38
3 7
36

I,3'

Kovacs,

Lovett,

Marsh,

Martin,

Meadowmoor,

43
Subversive Activities Control Board,
Smith,
Schware,
Wieman.44 It would be a rewarding exercise to trace carefully
their pattern of agreement and disagreement over this specific
field. Is the disagreement the result of a different reading of the
text of the amendment, a different view of the judicial function in
constitutional controversies, or a different view of what is the
greatest danger to democratic government? Whatever the source
of the difference, there can be no doubt about the consequences.
They spent their careers as justices in the shadow of each other,
and to a remarkable degree they served to define each other.
The result was reciprocal. Neither would have looked the same
to us had it not been for the contrast and measure of the other.
Justice Black measured against Justice Frankfurter has looked
at times doctrinaire; Justice Frankfurter measured against Justice
Black has looked at times finicky.
41

42

I would moreover attempt a further point, namely that Justice
Frankfurter's rhetoric when he disagreed with Justice Black may
29 The contrast between the two justices was the central theme of MENDELSON,
CONFLICT IN THE COURT (1961). The speech
cases were not an area of emphasis for him; but see id. at 51-60. A profitable
study might also be made of Justice, Black and Justice Douglas who have spent
twenty-six years on the Court together; while they very often vote together, they
show an interesting tendency to write their own opinions.
30 Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
81 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
32 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
33 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
84 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
35 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
36 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
87 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
88 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
39 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
40 Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
41 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
42 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
43 Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
44 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER:
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in no small part have been the source of the impression that
Black has been doctrinaire. At the moment the point is hardly
more than a suspicion, but my suspicion is that it is Justice
Frankfurter who may have somehow built the image of Justice
Black. One of their earliest encounters, Martin v. Struthers5 in
1943, is worth pausing for. It will be recalled as one of the major
Jehovah's Witness cases and it involved an ordinance prohibiting
door-to-door distribution of advertising or handbills. The majority
of the Court, speaking through Justice Black, found the ordinance
unconstitutional as applied to Witnesses. It was assuredly a close
question and produced four dissents, one of them by Justice
Frankfurter.
The Black opinion proceeds carefully, noting the leaflet
precedents such as Schneider v. Irvington 6 aid recognizing that
the resolution of the issue requires weighing the conflicting claims
of privacy and communication. It reviews the various reasons
asserted for the ordinance, such as protecting the daytime sleep
of night workers in an industrial town, and the possibilities of
fraud and crime. It then with impressive documentation notes on
the other side of the scale the widespread use of such tactics by
religious groups and labor, by the federal government in the
effort to sell war bonds, and, above all, in traditional door-to-door
political campaigning. The opinion notes also a model ordinance
drafted by the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers
which, unlike that before the Court, makes the ringing of the doorbell an offense only after the householder has indicated he does
not wish to be disturbed. It argues that the special vice of the
ordinance before the Court is that the matter is not left to the
individual homeowner to decide. The result, therefore, is that the
defendants may have been convicted for approaching people who
were in fact willing to be approached. Finally, the opinion argues
that the various objectives of the ordinance could be achieved
without so blanket an interference with the freedom to circulate
pamphlets.
I have traced the structure of the opinion in some detail with
an ulterior motive. However one would decide the issue itself, the
Black opinion would seem patient, careful with the counter considerations, and highly responsive to the precise issue before the
Court. We turn then to Justice Frankfurter in dissent and are told:
"[N]either the First nor the Fourteenth Amendment is to be
45
46

319 U.S. 141 (1943).
308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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treated by judges as though it were a mathematical abstraction,
an absolute having no relation to the lives of men." 47
IV
Before turning to more substantive aspects of Justice Black's
free speech views, there is another point about his style as a judge
that deserves comment. Some of his most notable efforts have come
not in majority opinions and not in dissents but in concurring
opinions-that is, when his side of the issue has won and when
nevertheless Justice Black has written a separate opinion in order
to protest that the Court has not gone far enough. In brief, one
of his most distinctive characteristics is that he has been an
impatient winner, a dissenter in victory.
At times, as in Peters v. Hobby,4" he has challenged the
tradition that the Court should not unnecessarily decide constitutional questions. In the Peters case the majority rested their
decision on the lack of authorization to the Loyalty Review
Board to review cases on its own motion; Justice Black joined
Justice Douglas in urging that the Court should have gone to the
basic constitutional issues involved. He said:
I agree that it is generally better for this Court not to decide constitutional questions in cases which can be adequately disposed of on nonconstitutional grounds.... But this generally accepted practice should
not be treated as though it were
an inflexible rule to be inexorably fol49
lowed under all circumstances.

Presumably Peters, as he saw it, was a case outside the general
practice because the program had such a wide sweep and had
affected so many lives, and because it had proved so difficult to
get a case challenging the loyalty program to the Court.
In Wieman v. Updegraj5 ° his impatience with victory is more
extreme. The case involved an Oklahoma loyalty oath, and the
Court in a unanimous decision upset it as unconstitutional because
of the failure to provide in the oath for scienter as to the nature
319

U.S.

at 152.
(1955).
49 Id. at 349. Compare Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961), where he insists that the constitutional issue
be reached and decided, and Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), where once again
he insists on deciding the constitutional issue. See also KALvEN, THE NEGRO AND THE
FRsT AmENDMENT 170 (Phoenix ed. 1966). But see Adderley v. Florida, 87 Sup. Ct.
242 (1966), where he complains that the majority has unnecessarily reached the
47

48 349 U.S. 331

first amendment issue.

50 344 U.s. 183 (1952).
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of the organization. It was an impressive victory at a time when
few anti-subversive measures were being found wanting. Yet
Justice Black wrote a separate concurrence which, after noting that
the Oklahoma law "is but one manifestation of a national network
of laws aimed at coercing and controlling the minds of men,""
went on with fervor to complain about the "national network of
laws." The opinion, although it has been admired, 2 so transcends
the issues before the Court as to become in effect an omnibus
dissent.
More often, however, the concurring opinion continues a
fight Justice Black has had with the Court and shows him unwilling to compromise with what he thinks is a wrong principle
even when on occasion it turns out well. Thus, for example, in
Bates v. Little Rock,5 a case involving compulsory disclosure of
NAACP membership, the Court again in a unanimous decision
upset the law. Balancing the negative impact of compulsory disclosure against the state's ostensible need for the disclosure, the
Court found lacking a sufficient state interest. Thus the Court
used a balancing test in a first amendment case and came down
in favor of speech. But Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas,
kept his record straight: there was nothing to balance.
First Amendment rights are beyond abridgement either by legislation
that directly restrains their exercise or by suppression or impairment
54
through harassment, humiliation, or exposure by government.

On more than one occasion, however, this unswerving adherence to principle has lent an appearance of divisiveness to the
Court at a time when consolidation of support around a promising
new majority position might have been desirable. In Kingsley
Int'l Pictures v. Regents,5 5 for example, the Court unanimously
decided that New York's refusal of a license for the movie Lady
Chatterly's Lover was unconstitutional, but it split as to the
exact grounds. In the opinion for the Court, Justice Stewart
uttered what may well be the strongest statement the Court
has ever made of the principle that the expression of any idea,
at 193.
"[O]ne of Justice Black's most impressive statements in behalf of First Amendment freedoms." Dnu.lm, op. cit. supra note 3, at 258.
53 361 U.S. 516 (1960). Compare Aptheker v. United States, 378 U.S. 500 (1964),
where he repeats his view that the Subversive Activities Control Act is unconstitutional in its entirety. Similarly in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), he
would stay with his Dennis dissent rather than rely on Harlan's narrowing of the
Smith Act.
51 Id.
52

54 361 U.S. at 528.
5 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
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however unsound or unattractive or unpopular, is fully protected
by the first amendment. "It protects," said the Justice, "advocacy
of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than
advocacy of socialism or the single tax."56 So succinct and unequivocal and daring a statement of the central point must have
delighted Justice Black; yet he was moved to add to the sense
of confusion generated by the multiple opinions in the case in
order to repeat his theme that all prior censorship was bad and
that that was the basic vice of the ruling in this case.
A more complicated instance of what seems to me the same
problem is offered by Justice Black's stance in Speiser v. Randall57
where the Court considered the validity of a California nonCommunist affidavit requirement for the procurement of a tax
exemption. The Court invalidated the requirement, but not on
the grounds that a loyalty oath was an absurdity when applied to
an activity as remote from sensitive government service as the
paying of taxes. Rather it relied on the circumstance that the
effect of the California procedure was to place the burden of
proof of loyalty on the taxpayer, thus chilling free speech so as to
violate the first and fifth amendments. The majority opinion thus
suggested a new technique for handling various loyalty oaths and
inquiries by shifting the burden of proof-a technique which, when
handled as skillfully as it was by Justice Traynor in Konigsberg
v. State Bar of California,"' could prove a powerful lawyer's
weapon on behalf of freedom. Again, however, Justice Black
could not rest with welcoming the new ally 59 but was moved with
Douglas to a separate opinion protesting that a loyalty oath is
bad in itself, however the burden of proof is allocated. And as in
Wieman, the Black opinion, although eloquent, moves away from
the particular case to a generic dissent against the mood of the day:
"This case offers just another example of a wide scale effort by
government in this country to impose penalties and disabilities
on everyone who is suspected of being a 'Communist' .. ."60
Very much the same problem is found in Gibson v. Florida
56

Id. at 689. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP.

CT. REv. 1, 29-30.
57 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
58 52 Cal. 2d 769, 776, 344 P.2d 777, 781-82 (1958), aff'd, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).

See Kalven & Steffen, The Bar Admission Cases: An Unfinished Debate Between Justice Harlan and Justice Black, 21 LAw IN TRANSrrION Q. 155, 173-79 (1961).
59 Yet in the second Konigsberg case, Justice Black, in dissent, speaks of Speiser
as "one of the very few liberty-producing decisions that this Court has rendered in
the last decade." Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 75 (1961).
60 357 U.S. at 530.
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Legislative Investigating Comm. 1 Here in the troubled area of the
law on legislative investigations, the Court upset a contempt conviction on the ground that no reasonable basis had been provided
for asking the witness the particular question. The analogy was to
the fourth amendment's prohibitions against unreasonable searches
and seizures and the Court was announcing that it would restrain
compulsory interrogation from what might be called an unreasonable search of the witness's mind. 2 Here again, in view of the
years of difficulty in finding some legal basis for restraining legislative committee questioning, the Court appeared to have forged a
powerful new weapon. Justice Black once again was restless in
victory and, with Douglas, voiced a separate opinion. The questioning about Communist affiliation, regardless of the foundation laid
for it, remains, he argued, an infringement of "the constitutional
right of association." 6
A final example is offered by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.64 Here the Court in upsetting an Alabama libel judgment had
arguably revolutionized free speech theory, relying heavily on the
prohibition of seditious libel as the "central meaning of the First
Amendment." The Court was moving directly along the path that
Alexander Meiklejohn and Justice Black had been urging to the
position that speech on public issues could not be abridged. It was
thus a red-letter day for this thesis.6 5 Yet once again we find
Justice Black concurring separately. The Court had left the
possibility that a libel of a public official would be actionable if
malice in fact were shown, and Justice Black, once more along
with Douglas, thought this an unwise qualification of the principle
involved.
It is not easy to know what to make of this aspect of Black's
judicial style. It may well be its most distinctive characteristic.
If we remember the English convention of seriatim opinions, we
should perhaps not regard concurring opinions as in any sense
divisive. And surely it is admirable not to compromise key principles and to resist victories based on ingenious devices used only to
achieve a momentary consensus. Yet I cannot down a twinge of
regret at this picture of Justice Black austerely leaving his friends
to go it alone.
61 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
02 KALvEN,
03 372 U.S.
04

op. cit. supra note 49, at 114-15.

at 559.
376 U.S. '254 (1964).

65 See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the
First Amendment, 79 -ARv. L. REv. 1 (1965); Kalven, The New York Times Case:
A Note on the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191.
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Turning now from considerations of the Justice's style and
approach to a look at his substantive views on free speech policy,
I shall not center on his operational formula for measuring freedom
of speech, a formula that early outran clear and present danger 6
and that now appears to outrun also the Meiklejohn test of speech
on public issues"7 and to rely heavily on the distinction between
speech and conduct. Rather I shall examine his views in three
areas, chosen from the many that beckon: (i) his views on balancing; (ii) his views on obscenity; and (iii) his views on the symbolic speech aspects of the civil rights movement.
There has in the past decade been much discussion of whether
a balancing test is the appropriate measure of first amendment
protections,6 and Justice Black has been the champion against
those who would balance. In the Communist Party case in 1961
Justice Black lamented bitterly:
I see no possible way to escape the fateful consequences of a return
to the era [of the Alien and Sedition Acts] in which all government
critics had to face the probability of being sent to jail except for this
Court to abandon what I consider to be the dangerous constitutional
doctrine of "balancing" to which the Court is at present adhering. 69

While the controversy over balancing indicates the remarkable
reach of the protection of speech the Justice would afford under the
first amendment and thus opens a window on what has perhaps been

most distinctive about his substantive views, the controversy seems
to me on the whole to have been an unfortunate, misleading, and unnecessary one. It has been shrouded in semantic confusions and has
66 In Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), Justice Black used the clear
and present danger test but noted prophetically that: "Those cases do not purport
to mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression, nor do we
here. They do no more than recognize a minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights.
For the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law 'abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press.' It must be taken as a command of the broadest
scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow." Id. at 263.
Compare his dissent in Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), where he found

insufficient danger of a breach of peace. By 1961 in the second Konigsberg case he
was explicit about going beyond the test: "I recognize, of course, that the 'clear and
present danger' test, though itself a great advance toward individual liberty over
some previous notions of the protections afforded by the First Amendment, does not
go as far as my own views as to the protection that should be afforded these freedoms .... But I fear that the creation of 'tests' by which speech is left unprotected
under certain circumstances is a standing invitation to abridge it." 366 U.S. at 63.
67

Id. at 64-65, 65 n.19.

68 See literature collected in LocKHART, KAMISAR
TUTIONAL RIGnTS AND LIBmTIs 494-503 (1964).
69 367 U.S. at 164.

& CHOPER, CASES ON CONSTI-
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generated a philosophic debate both in and out of the Court, a debate
which runs far beyond the cases.
This is not the place to state the full argument.70 But it should
be noted that there are some cases in which Justice Black himself
would balance interests in order to solve the constitutional issue;
and there are other cases in which Justice Harlan, who has been
perhaps his chief adversary here, would reject balancing as the
appropriate approach. Thus, in Martin v. Struthers7 Justice Black
writing for the majority framed the issue as follows:
We are faced in the instant case with the necessity of weighing
the conflicting interests of the appellant in the civil rights she claims,
as well as the right of the individual householder to determine whether
he is willing to receive her message, against the interest of the community which by this ordinance offers to protect the interests of all
of its citizens .... 72

And conversely when the issue is the advocacy of adultery, as it was
in Kingsley Pictures," or seditious libel, as it was in New York
Times,74 no one on the Court and certainly not Justice Harlan would

argue that the interests are to be balanced to determine whether the
speech in question can be prohibited.
What then is the fuss about? One can discern two aspects of
the controversy. The first turns on the large question of whether the
first amendment is "an absolute," that is, is to be read literally as
prohibiting any regulation of speech content. On this approach the
balancing controversy concerns the question of whether there are to
be any exceptions-for obscenity, fair trial, incitement, libel, etc.
This is, of course, a fair question, but it seems highly unprofitable
to frame it in terms of balancing. It concerns rather the determination of what is included in the key phrase "freedom of speech."
Perhaps the readiest way to dispose of this particular quarrel over
the idiom is to note that Alexander Meiklejohn, who distinguished
sharply between public speech which could not be regulated at all
and private speech which was subject to reasonable regulation,"
would have to be regarded as guilty of balancing in the private
6 where Justice Black consphere. Moreover in Smith v. California,7
70 1 have struggled with the problem elsewhere. See KALVEN, op. cit. supra note
49, at 121; Kalven & Steffen, supra note 58.
71 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
72 Id. at 143.
73 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
74 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
75 MEKLE~JOHN, PoLrricAL FREDom (1960). See also Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245.
76 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
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curred separately in order to argue that obscenity was not subject
to regulation at all, he scarcely referred to the evils of balancing in
arguing his point.
There is, however, a narrower and more interesting wing of the
debate." It concerns a special kind of speech problem-when the
inhibition of speech is a by-product of regulation aimed at some
other objective. Many contemporary speech issues do not involve
regulation of content by criminal sanctions but something more
oblique. The most vivid examples thus far have been cases involving
compulsory disclosure of membership in a group when the very
disclosure might, as a matter of behavior, activate community prejudice, thus in the end inhibiting people from joining the group.
Bates v. Little Rock, discussed above, 78 is a good example of what
is involved. Here an ordinance in support of an occupational license
tax required disclosure by organizations of those who paid dues.
In the case, the organization in question was the NAACP. And it
was apparent that disclosure of membership, given the climate of
opinion in the South, might inhibit people from joining or remaining
in the NAACP. Accepting the ostensible purpose of the state in
wanting the information, the Court nevertheless invalidated the
requirement on the ground that the collateral interference with
freedom of association outweighed the state's need for the information. Justice Black concurring separately would have invalidated the
requirement simply on the ground that it had some inhibiting impact
on membership.
It is reasonably clear that it is only in cases of this special type
that the Court has ever used balancing in applying the first amendment. What is involved, therefore, is not a grand philosophic debate
about construing the Constitution but a technical and difficult question of how to evaluate this one type of interference with free speech
and association. And what is arresting about Justice Black's position
is that even in these cases he would apparently not weigh the magnitude of the indirect interference against the purposes of the state, but
would invalidate outright on the ground that any degree of indirect
and collateral interference is, in and of itself, sufficient.
Although he is clearly more protective of speech in these cases
than is the majority of the Court, there remains a certain ambiguity
in his position. He appears to be saying that even in cases of
77 Justice Harlan is especially clear about the distinction in Konigsberg v. State
Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
.78 See text accompanying note 53 supra. See also KALVEN, op. cit. supra note 49,
at 95-97.
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inadvertent and unintended interference with speech, the most incidental impairment damns the regulation. If so, this would indeed
mark a heroic stringency in defense of freedom of speech. He may,
however, be saying merely that in cases where the regulation has
an impact on speech content but an ostensible purpose not keyed
to speech, he simply does not believe the ostensible purpose and
reads the measure as one designed to limit freedom of speech.
If so, this would in some cases mark a heroic realism in going behind official motivation.
His explanation in the second Konigsberg case"9 of his willingness to balance in Martin v. Struthers is suggestive of this latter
interpretation. There are, he says, a group of cases involving public
streets where city ordinances have attempted regulation designed
to insure cleanliness, to maintain traffic flow, or to protect noise
level:
When those cases came before this Court, we did not treat the issue

posed by them as one primarily involving First Amendment rights....
[H]owever, we recognized that the enforcement of even these ordinances which attempted no regulation at all of the content of speech
and which were neither openly nor surreptitiously aimed at speech,
could bring about an "incidental" abridgement of speech.80

The balancing issue is thus seen to be complex indeed, but to have
been operative within the Court only in a limited number of cases.
The full flowering of judicial controversy over the issue comes in
the second Konigsberg case where Justices Black and Harlan
engage in a notably sustained debate over balancing. 8
It is characteristic of Justice Black's admirable concern that
he has been so resolutely on guard against even incidental impairment of free speech. But the whole balancing "war" seems to me
to have been a fruitless one, generating on the one hand an unnecessary philosophic debate and obscuring on the other, by its
large rhetoric, a hard technical free speech issue. Some of the
responsibility for the "war" rests with Justice Black.
VI
When we come to the regulation of obscenity, it is instructive
to compare Justice Black to Judge Jerome Frank. They are
equally staunch opponents of any regulation, but their reaction
79

366 U.S. 36 (1961).

80 Id. at 69. (Emphasis added.)
81 There is also extended debate between them along these same lines in Baren-

blatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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to the problem is wondrously different. Judge Frank was fascinated by the phenomenon of obscenity as an aspect of human
behavior and by the paradoxes involved in justifying its regulation.
He was full of the detail, the color, the absurdity, the human
interest of the topic. 82 Justice Black on the other hand seems

totally disinterested in obscenity as such. He protects it so fiercely
chiefly as a logical compulsion from his general views about free
speech.
In Kingsley Pictures" in 1959, as already noted, Justice
Black concurred in a separate opinion and made two favorite
points. The first is that prior censorship, regardless of what it is
keyed to, is bad; hence, the entire movie licensing scheme was
unconstitutional. 4 His second point is that the regulation of obscenity imposes an impossibly subjective, impossibly unjudicial task
on a court: "[M]y belief is that this Court is about the most inappropriate Supreme Board of Censors that could be found."8 "
Further, he argues there is no way of indicating in advance what
will be thought obscene; so the whole enterprise of regulating
obscenity "cannot easily be reconciled with the rule of law which
our Constitution envisages."8 " He concludes almost wistfully:
"In my judgment the Court should not permit itself to get into
the very center of such policy controversies which have so little
in common with lawsuits."87 Finally, a special feature of the
Kingsley appeal should be noted. The movie, Lady Chatterly's
Lover, was shown to the Court; Justice Black simply declined to
view it.
A few months later in Smith v. California8 he again spoke
to the problem, this time in a case involving criminal prosecution
of a book seller. He repeated his protest against any regulation of
obscenity, but the emphasis had shifted somewhat. First he argued
that simply as a matter of construing the amendment, it flatly
82 Judge Frank stated his views in the "appendix" to his opinion in Roth v.
United States, 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956). I have attempted to express my admiration
for his opinion in a "book review" of it. See 24 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 769 (1957).
83 360 U.S. 684 (1959). Justice Black did not elect to write separately in the
Court's leading case in this area, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), but
joined in Justice Douglas' dissent.
84 His insistence on the generic odium of prior restraints is reminiscent of his
distinctive hostility to test oaths and bills of attainder. See American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), and United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
85 360 U.S. at 690.
86 Id. at 691.
87 Ibid. There is a haunting similarity between this "complaint" and Thurman
Arnold's "advice" to the Vermont Supreme Court in an obscenity case. See ARNoLD,
FAnR FIGHTS AND FotL ch. 18 (1965) ; Kalven, supra note 56, at 43-45.
88 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
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prohibits the regulation of obscenity. Since obscenity uses words or
speech, it is protected under the amendment like all other words
or speech. "I read 'no law abridging' to mean no law abridging.' 9
Second, he professed to see in the regulation of obscenity a step
"on the way to national censorship."
While it is "obscenity and indecency" before us today, the experience
of mankind-both ancient and modem-shows that this type of elastic
phrase can, and most likely will, be synonymous with the political and
maybe with the religious unorthodoxy of tomorrow. °0

This seems to me an unpersuasive way to put the case against
obscenity laws. The Court has shown a marked tendency not to
expand the concept,"' as is evident from the refusal to permit its
extension to sadistic violence in Winters v. New York,9 2 or to
sacrilege in Burstyn v. Wilson,93 or to thematic obscenity in
Kingsley Pictures.9 4
He repeated his opposition in 1964 in Jacobellis v. Ohio," a
case involving a French movie, The Lovers, which the Court
found not obscene. This is the case in which the Court added the
criterion "utterly without social importance" to the constitutional
test of obscenity, thus importantly narrowing what can be regulated
as obscene. This time Justice Black stated his points in a brief
paragraph. He repeated that the Court is "about the most inappropriate Board of Censors that could be found." He also
repeated his reading of the amendment: To convict anyone for
"exhibiting a motion picture," regardless of the grounds, abridges
freedom of speech.
Finally, in the Ginzburg trilogy of last spring,96 Justice Black
offered the clearest evidence, if more were needed, of his unceasing
opposition to any regulation of obscenity. In Ginzburg v. United
States97 he wrote at some length in dissent. His emphasis shifted
from the first amendment concerns to the argument, quite effective
given the circumstances of the case, that there was no proper
warning or notice to the defendant that his conduct would be
regarded as criminal. He further added that after the Court's opin89 Id. at 157.
90 Id. at 160.

91 Kalven, supra note 56, at 34 n.104.
92 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
93 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
94 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
95 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
96 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383
U.S. 463 (1966) ; Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
97 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
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ions in the case itself, the law was left intrinsically and irremediably
vague, and observed, in an interestingly final paragraph, that discussion of sex was now made "exceedingly dangerous."
The climax of his fight against obscenity regulation may
fairly be said to come in one of the companion cases to Ginzburg,
Mishkin v. New York. 98 Mishkin was the kind of case that embarrasses opponents of obscenity laws; the defendant was convicted
of selling books catering to sadomasochistic sexual tastes the genre
of which may be suggested by a brief sample of titles: Cult of the
Spankers; Stud Broad; So Firm, So Fully Packed; Swish Bottom.9
One can, under the circumstances, only admire Justice Black's
display of courage and integrity and poise in dissenting at some
length.100 He admonished:
I would reverse this case and announce that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments taken together command that neither Congress nor the
States shall pass laws which in any manner abridge freedom of speech
and press-whatever the subjects discussed. I think the Founders

of our Nation in adopting the First Amendment meant precisely that
the Federal Government should pass "no law" regulating speech and

press but should confine its legislation to the regulation of conduct. So
too, that policy of the First Amendment made applicable to the States

by the Fourteenth, leaves the States vast power to regulate conduct but
no power at all, in my judgment, to make the expression oj views a
crime.101

Prior to Ginzburg, one would have been tempted to observe
that Justice Black was failing to note how with each succeeding
case the constitutional law of obscenity was evolving by a common
law process that added restrictive qualifications to the test, and
that he was being too solemnly principled in opposition to a shrewd
Court that was willing to hold in theory that obscenity was subject
to regulation but was disposed in practice never again to find anything obscene. But the general sense of surprise attending the
Ginzburg decision may suggest that his long view of the matter was
sound after all.
Vii
This survey of Justice Black's life work on the Court on behalf of freedom of speech is brought to a poignant conclusion by
98 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
99 The titles, I hasten to add, are listed in the appendix to the majority's opinion,
383 U.S. at 514-15.
100 And that of Justice Stewart who continued his dissent from the Jacobelis
case that, although he could not define pornography, he was sure this was not it. Id.

at 518.

101 383 U.S. at 517-18. (Emphasis added.)
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consideration of one further group of cases, those involving
symbolic speech in public or semi-public places. °2 Arguably this
is becoming the liveliest free speech issue of the moment, and there
is a dramatic reversal of the Justice's role. Even though several of
his colleagues on the Court are moved to protect it as speech, the
"speech" in question falls beyond the pale of his generous view of
the reach of the amendment. In brief, at the close of his great
career it is Justice Black's fate to be confronted with a kind of
speech he cannot feel the first amendment protects. To anticipate
my own conclusion, the story is at once a tribute to Justice Black's
extraordinary integrity in adherence to principle in his free speech
decisions, and a symptom of certain limitations in the overriding
principle by which he has adjudged speech cases.
The problem has thus far involved two somewhat different
situations best dealt with separately: public issue picketing arising
out of the civil rights movement, and protest gestures like the
sit-in.
Justice Black's views on public issue picketing were set forth
in Cox v. Louisiana.' A very large group of students had picketed
the courthouse in protest of some civil rights arrests. They were
convicted of breach of peace, of obstructing a public way, and of
violating a statute prohibiting picketing near courthouses. The
majority upset all three convictions on a variety of grounds not
relevant here. Justice Black joined a unanimous Court in upsetting
the breach of peace conviction; he concurred in upsetting the obstruction conviction, but did so only on equal protection grounds,
indicating that a flat prohibition of the use of the streets for
picketing would be valid in his view; and, finally, he dissented
from the reversal of the conviction for picketing the courthouse.
What immediately catches the eye in the expression of his
views here is that he would distinguish so sharply between speech
and "speech plus" and would be so amenable to letting the state
regulate speech plus. Thus he says:
I have no doubt about the general power of Louisiana to bar all picket-

ing on its streets and highways. Standing, patrolling, or marching back
and forth on streets is conduct, not speech, and as conduct can be regulated or prohibited. 10 4
102 See KALVEN, op. cit. supra note 49, at 123-72; Kalven, The Concept of the
Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 1; Kamin, Residential Picketing
and the First Amendment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 177 (1966).
103 379 U.S. 536, 559 (1965).
104 Id. at 581. Earlier in his opinion he suggests that the power to bar might be
qualified by the principles of Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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And again: "Picketing, though it may be utilized to communicate
ideas is not speech, and therefore is not of itself protected by the
First Amendment."' 1 5 And still again:
The First and -Fourteenth Amendments, I think, take away from government, state and federal, all power to restrict freedom of speech,
press and assembly where people have a right to be for such purposes.
This does not mean, however, that these amendments also grant a constitutional right to engage in the conduct of picketing or patrolling
10 6
whether on publicly owned streets or on privately owned property.

Behind the decisive distinction he draws between speech and
conduct runs a deep concern over the speed with which a demonstration can degenerate into a mob.
[M]inority groups, I venture to suggest, are the ones who always
have suffered the most and always will suffer the most when street
multitudes are allowed to substitute their pressures for less
glamorous
10 7
but more dependable and temperate processes of the law.

And lest anyone miss the point, he adds:
Those who encourage minority groups to believe that the United
States Constitution and federal laws give them a right to patrol and
picket in the street wherever they choose, in order to advance what
they think to be a just and noble end, do no service to those minority
08
groups, their cause, or their country.'

I have argued elsewhere that this view tends to miss the
importance in a free society of what might be called the use of
streets and public places as a public forum, that it overstates the
difference between speech pure and speech plus, and that what is
required is neutral regulation of time, place, and manner on analogy
to Robert's Rules of Order.09 These are admittedly difficult issues
and there may prove to be seeds of anarchy in the new techniques
of protest. 10 But it remains something of a puzzle how Justice
Black, who has been so sympathetic to the "poor man's printing
press" and so tolerant of the noise in Kovacs,"' the intrusion in
Martin,"2 the anonymity in Talley,"3 can be so impatient with
this kind of communication. It is as though his strategy of protect1065 379 U.S. at 578.
106 Ibid.
107

Id. at 583-84.

108 Id. at 584.
109 Kalven, supra note 102.

110 See Kamin, supra note 102.
111 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
112 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
113 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). And, one is tempted to add, of

labor picketing in Milkwagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287
(1941).
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ing all speech just because it was something other than conduct
traps him when he is confronted by conduct which is symbolic.
Justice Black, it must be admitted, had a lot of company in
Cox. All of the justices agreed in dictum that picketing a courthouse
could be prohibited and none said directly that the streets might
not be closed in a non-discriminatory way to all demonstrations.
Suprisingly, however, the symbolic aspects of the sit-in are
producing a more controversial result. In the first great sit-in case,
Garner v. Louisiana"4 in 1961, Justice Harlan, concurring in the
overturning of the convictions for breach of peace, paid a remarkable tribute to the symbolic aspects of the sit-in gesture:
There was more to the conduct of those petitioners than a bare
desire to remain at the "white" lunch counter and their refusal of a
police request to move from the counter. We would surely have to be
blind not to recognize that these petitioners were sitting at .those
counters, where they knew they would not be served, in order to demonstrate that their race was being segregated in dining facilities in this
part of the country.
Such a demonstration in the circumstances . . . is as much a part
of the "free trade in ideas," Abrams v. United States, . . . as is verbal
expression, more commonly thought of as "speech." It, like speech, appeals to good sense and to the "power of reason as applied through
public discussion," Whitney v. California, . . . just as much as, if not
more than, a public oration delivered from a soapbox at a street corner. This Court has never limited the right to speak, a protected
"liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment . . . to mere verbal expression. [Citing Stromberg v. California, Thornhill v. Alabama, and West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette and noting also NAACP v.
Alabama.] If the act of displaying a red flag as a symbol of opposition
to organized government is a liberty encompassed within free speech
as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . the act of sitting at
a privately owned lunch counter with the consent of the owner, as
a demonstration of opposition to enforced segregation, is surely within
the same range of protections. This is not to say, of course, that the
Fourteenth Amendment reaches to demonstrations conducted on private
property over the objection of the owner . . . just as it would surely
not encompass verbal expression in a private home if the owner has
not consented. 116

Mr. Justice Harlan thereby stirred up the possibility that to
some extent the first amendment could be brought to the aid of the
sit-ins as they battled against a variety of Southern breach of
peace and trespass statutes. In 1964 in his dissent in Bell v.
Maryland,116 Justice Black got his first chance to comment on the
368 U.S. 157 (1961).
115 Id. at 201-02.
116 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
114
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free speech aspects of the sit-in, although the majority did not
upset the convictions on free speech grounds. "It is wholly clear,"
Justice Black said "that the Maryland statute here is directed not
against what the petitioners said but against what they did .... ;117
The free speech analogy was characterized brusquely as "a bootstrap argument" and finally we were told: "The right to freedom
of expression is a right to express views-not18 a right to force
other people to supply a platform or a pulpit.'
Perhaps the most dramatic collision of views came just a year
ago in Brown v. Louisiana,"9 the so-called Library Sit-In Case.
Here, in a five to four decision, the majority, speaking through Mr.
Justice Fortas, reversed breach of peace convictions of five Negroes
who, after being asked to leave, sat in a public library in order
to protest the segregation of library facilities. Justice Fortas found
no evidence of a breach of peace and hence found the convictions
a violation of due process. He did not stop there, however, but
went on to say:
But there is another and sharper answer which is called for. We
are here dealing with an aspect of a basic constitutional right-the
right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments guaranteeing freedom of speech and assembly, and freedom to petition the Government
As this Court has repeatedly stated,
for a redress of grievances ....
these rights are not confined to verbal expression. They embrace appropriate types of action which certainly include the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest by silent and reproachful presence,
in a place where the protestant has every right to be, the unconstitutional segregation of public facilities. Accordingly, even if the accused
action were within the scope of the statutory instrument, we would
be required to assess the constitutional impact of its application, and
we would have to hold that the statute cannot constitutionally be applied to punish petitioners' actions in the circumstances of this case.
The statute was deliberately and purposefully applied solely to terminate the reasonable, orderly, and limited exercise of the right to protest
the unconstitutional segregation of a public facility. Interference with
so exercised, by state action is intolerable under our Constithis right,
1 20
tution.

The sit-in as symbolic speech would seem to have acquired
constitutional status, thus enlarging the domain of the first amendment. The opinion for the four-man dissent was written by Justice
the review of his years with the first
Black and serves to bring
121
amendment full circle.
Id. at 325.
118 Ibid.
117

119 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
120
121

Id. at 141-42.
Perhaps not quite full circle. Adderley v. Florida, 87 Sup. Ct. 242 (1966),
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After several disagreements with the majority's handling of the
case on non-speech grounds, he came to the constitutional issue.
He began by objecting to the fact that the Court unnecessarily
reached the issue; but he was not insensitive to the irony of
voicing such a complaint:
I have sometimes thought that this Court has gone entirely too far in
refusing to decide constitutional questions on the ground that they
should be avoided where possible. The journey here, however, goes
22
entirely too far in the opposite direction.'

As would by now be expected, Justice Black would have none
of the speech rationale. 1 23 After repeating that the first amendment
for him is the very heart of free government, he added:
But I have never thought and do not now think that the First Amendment can sustain the startling doctrine the prevailing opinion here
creates. The First Amendment, I think, protects speech, writings, and
expression of views in any manner in which they can be legitimately
and validly communicated. But I have never believed that it gives any
person or group of persons the constitutional right to go wherever
they want, whenever they please, without regard to the rights of pri124
vate or public property or to state law.

Finally, the opinion disclosed again the threat of anarchy
Justice Black sees lurking in all these gestures of protest. He
suggested such exercise of "free speech" will quickly lead to chaos
as other groups attempt to exert their comparable privilege "to
stage 'sit-ins' or 'stand-ups' to dramatize their particular views
on particular issues."'1 25 There was almost a direct editorial aside
to the Negro leaders:
came down while this article was being written, and it provides another important
gloss on the meaning of the first amendment when symbolic conduct is involved. In
a five to four decision the Court upheld criminal trespass convictions of defendants
who continued demonstrations on jail grounds after being asked to leave. The majority opinion is by Justice Black. It dismisses any first amendment claim: "Such an
argument has as its major unarticulated premise the assumption that people who
want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever
and however and wherever they please. That concept of constitutional law was vigorously and forthrightly rejected in two of the cases petitioners rely on . .

.

. We

reject it again. The United States Constitution does not forbid a state to 'control the
use of its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose." Id. at 247.
The dissenting opinion, which relies heavily on first amendment considerations, is by
Justice Douglas. 'There is perhaps some irony in the circumstance that after thirty
years of challenging and prodding the Court in first amendment cases, Justice Black
is at last spokesman for the majority and is writing in opposition to his old partner
in dissent, Justice Douglas.
122 383 U.S. at 164. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
123 "[Tlhe conclusion that the statute was unconstitutionally applied because
it interfered with the petitioners' so-called protest establishes a completely new constitutional doctrine." 383 U.S. at 165.
124 Id. at 166.
125 Id. at 167.
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It is an unhappy circumstance in my judgment that the group, which
more than any other has needed a government of equal laws and equal
justice, is now encouraged to believe that the best way for it to advance its cause, which is a worthy one, is by taking the law into its
own hands from place to place and from time to time.' 26

And the opinion closed with Justice Black characteristically
citing history for his point. But this time he was citing not the
history of tyranny but of mob rule, and he was citing it in dissent
to a majority of his colleagues who would extend the protection of
the first amendment:
But I say once more that the crowd moved by noble ideals today can
become the mob ruled by hate and passion and greed and violence

tomorrow. If we ever doubted that, we know it now. The peaceful
songs of love can become as stirring and provocative as the Marseillaise
did in the days when a noble revolution gave way to rule by successive
mobs until chaos set in. The holding in this case today makes it more
necessary than ever that we stop and look more closely at where we
127
are going.

Surely no one has more earned the right to be heeded when
he warns of the dangers in freedom than Justice Black. Equally
surely, the tensions now appearing in his first amendment position
between the utter protection given to speech and the limited protection given conduct, even when symbolic, dramatize the question
for the future: whether, without sacrificing the great traditions of
peace and order, we can accommodate protests outside the normal
and conventional channels of communication in society-a question
found not only in the civil rights movement, but in the churches
and on the campuses as well. Whatever the future may have to say
about the difficult question Justice Black leaves with us, it will
see, in his thirty years of working the traditions of the first amendment, thirty years of noble service.' 28
126
127
128

Id. at 167-68.
Id. at 167-68.

Somehow the framework into which I have cast this article has kept me from
noting appropriately how admirable and prescient Justice Black's dissent was in
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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